

can mean only disaster to Siam. Almost all of Siamese export business is in the hands of the Chinese, who in recently years helped Siamese export so much that the Sino-Siamese trade is in the former's favor by a wide margin. Siam's prosperity depends upon her agriculture, and Chinese help in this field is too well known to be repeated. The export of her rice constitutes over 70 per cent of her total export, and one-third of her exported

rice comes to China⁽⁶⁾. If China boycotts Siamese rice, the national economy of Siam will be threatened⁽⁷⁾. If the oversea Chinese lose their preeminent position in Siam, it will be, according to the condition that obtains at present, to the advantage of the Japanese and not the Siamese. This is certainly a point worthy of careful consideration.

Siam's Anti-Chinese Measures and China's Boycott

By YANG HSIN (楊信)

THE causes of Siam's anti-Chinese movement having been fully dwelt upon by Lin Hsi-chun, it is the purpose of this article to give the highlights of the difficulties under which our compatriots in Siam labor. As space does not permit, the history of the anti-Chinese measures is in most cases reduced to mere mention of dates.

The grievances that our overseas have against the Siamese government may be grouped under four headings: (1) the immigration law, (2) the education laws, (3) the labor laws, and (4) heavy taxation.]

The last oppressive measure was already treated by Mr. Lin in his previous article, and needs no further elucidation here except the recent press reports to the effect that over 1,000 Chinese were arrested in Siam. According to the oversea Chinese newspaper clippings shown us by the delegate our compatriots in Siam sent home, arrests were made in Bangkok, within three hours, of about 1,000 persons, it was estimated, who failed to pay the help-the-government tax (助政費) of 5 *bahts* per head. The report failed to state whether the arrested were Chinese or Siamese, but judging by the number of Chinese in Bangkok we may safely say that majority of them must have been Chinese. The arrested were made to pay the tax and a fine in cash or work.

The labor laws were three in number: first that which affects the transportation workers of the Siamese railways, second that which affects the rice mill hands, and third that which affects the fishermen.

Formerly the railway transportation workers were all Chinese. In 1932 the Siamese government singled out this for the first attack on the Chinese laborers, because the railways are under its direct control. It replaced 70 per cent of the Chinese workers with Siamese, and the feeble protest offered by the Chinese laborers led the Siamese government to adopt more similar measures in other labor markets.

Then in 1933 came the rice mill labor law. The percentage of Siamese laborers which the law requires the rice mills to employ differs according to different reports: some put it at 70 and some at 50. Due to strict censorship of news, it is impossible to ascertain the truth of the case, but most probably this is what happened. The law as first promulgated required 70 per cent of the mill hands to be Siamese, but due to the protests of the Chinese capitalists (who own between 80 to 90 per cent of the rice mills in Siam) and laborers (who number some 6,000 to 7,000 in Bangkok mills alone), the percentage was re-

duced, officially or otherwise, so that the Chinese and the Siamese share the work fifty-fifty. This law alone must have thrown at least 2,000-3,000 Chinese out of work in Bangkok. The Siamese are not taking full advantage of the labor law, for few of them are industrious enough to seek work, and fewer still are they who can stand the hardship.

Finally there is the fishermen's labor law, which was enforced during last summer. Next to rice, fish is the most important food in Siam, and yet 90 per cent of the fishery industry is in the hands of the Chinese. The Siamese government attempted to enforce a 70 per cent labor law on Chinese-owned fishing boats. Due to the protest of the Chinese fishermen who went to Bangkok in thousands, and due to the shortage of fish when the law was rigidly enforced, the Siam government now regards it best not to be too strict in enforcing the law.

There were also rumors that law would be enacted to require every Chinese shop in Siam to take in at least one Siamese. Whether that is true or not we are unable to verify.]At any rate, in a recent parliamentary debate the Siamese Minister of Economic Affairs in self-defence said that over 3,000 Siamese have obtained work through the efforts of the Bureau of Labor. To promulgate laws which it can not enforce and to give work to some 3,000 men among the 12,000,000, and thereby antagonize the people who control 70-80 per cent of the business and industry of the land—this is what the Siamese government has done.

Siam's immigration law was first promulgated in 1929, and subsequently revised in 1931 and 1933. As it stands today, the immigrant must be free from trachoma, must know either the Siamese language or his own written language. The landing tax is 10 *bahts* and there is a "process fee" of 13.50 *bahts*. In addition, he must pay 100 *bahts* for the right of domicile. If he goes back with the idea of returning to Siam, he must take out a return passport which will cost him 20 *bahts* and is good for only one year, otherwise he will be treated as a newcomer upon his return.

The effectiveness of the 1933 Siamese immigration law in barring the Chinese from entry into the country may be seen from the fact that before this revision a steamer carried hundreds of immigrants from China each

(6) In view of the fact that the Siamese officially put the figure of their exported rice to Singapore, Hongkong, and China at 75 per cent, the 30 per cent cited here must mean rice exported direct to China.—L. Y.

(7) See the article by Yang Hsin below.—L. Y.

trip, and after it a steamer carries only about a score of them, many of whom can not land because of the literacy clause. In the case of Chinese women, they are practically barred from entry of the country due to the literacy clause and other "process."

There are three education laws in Siam: first, the law of 1917, governing private schools; second the compulsory education law of 1923-33; and third a supplementary law to these two, promulgated only last November, for a résumé of which see the "Oversea Chinese" column last week. The first two laws require the Chinese schools to have Siamese principals, and to teach Siamese for 21 hour 15 minutes a week, leaving 7 hours to teach Chinese. They also require the Chinese teachers to pass Siamese government examinations on their proficiency in the Siamese language before teachers' certificates would be issued to them, and also to have all their ten fingers finger-printed, while the Siamese teachers are not required to do so. The measure which caused so much opposition from the Chinese and started the boycott of Siamese rice was the attempt of the Siamese government to stop the Chinese schools from conducting even the compulsory classes. Because of the opposition by the Chinese, the enforcement of this measure was postponed, and lately the Siamese Ministry of Education has been recalling the licences of the Chinese schools, requiring them to take out new registration papers for the compulsory classes. This was at first an administrative act of the ministry, but in the latest education law it was legalized.

Unfair as all these measures are, yet the actual practice is worse, as pointed out by *The Lak Muang Siamese Daily News* on October 30, 1935, in its editorial, part of which we retranslate from the Chinese below. This Siamese paper found that Sino-Siamese trade relations, especially Siam's export of rice to China, have recently been adversely affected, and the cause was Siam's education law. It then pointed out that the education laws and regulations governing their enforcement were unsatisfactory in five different respects:—

1. The curriculum that the Ministry of Education worked out for the Chinese schools allows only 2 hours a week for teaching Chinese, and these two hours are placed after three o'clock. Moreover, the teachers for the lower grades must be Siamese and must have passed Standard Three. This requirement is beyond the requirements set by the resolutions of the State Council (Cabinet). It is hard for us to believe that they were not instituted by Phra Sarasah Prapan and Nai Navarat [former Minister of Education and Secretary of the Ministry].

2. The schools founded by westerners or Mohamedans are not subject to the same regulations as the Chinese schools. There is no recall of their licences, which is required of Chinese schools. They are not subject to the same regulation as shown in the above paragraph, they may teach 7 hours a week in foreign language. Moreover, very recently one school founded by westerners received special treatment by the Ministry of Education. This is directly the opposite of the treatment accorded the Chinese, and we learned of it from one of the teachers of the school concerned. Whether or not it is true the Ministry of Education knows best.

3. Chinese night schools tried, when Phra Sarasah Prapan and Nai Navarat were in their posts in the Ministry of Education, to register with the Ministry of Education, and no licences were issued them. At the same time, night schools for teaching other languages found no difficulty in getting their licences. This means that Chinese schools did

not receive fair treatment, because the law governing private schools does not specify the language to be taught.

4. Any Chinese wishing to become a teacher in Chinese schools must be able to show a certificate, or Phra Sarasah Prapan will not issue him a teacher's certificate. If the Chinese certificate should have no stamp-tax stamp, Phra Sarasah Prapan would seize this as an excuse to say that the certificate was a piece of forgery and refuse the applicant's request. In this he is going beyond the limit of the law for regulating private schools.

5. The registration of the compulsory classes of Chinese schools in accordance with the compulsory education law has always been unduly delayed, and many received no answer, or any notice giving the reasons for the delay or non-issuance of the licence. This has caused no small amount of trouble.

All these mistakes must have originated with Nai Navarat, who proposed them to Phra Sarasah Prapan. He must therefore be responsible for it all. Chinese schools have brought many charges against him but in each case Phra Sarasah Prapan turned a deaf ear. We received many letters taking Nai Navarat to task, and we could say nothing in reply. For the Ministry of Education seems to have been placed in a very hard situation.

However, it is hoped that the new [i.e. the present] Minister of Education will pay more attention to these problems with an eye to their commercial and economic effects.

In other words, the boycott of Siamese rice is having its effects on the Siamese people. According to the official figures recently released, Siam's exported rice during the first nine months last year, as compared with that of the same period the year before last, is:

January-September, 1934	1,377,598 tons
January-September, 1935	1,131,480 tons
Difference	246,118 tons

This decrease of over 17 per cent may be partly attributed to the difference between the area under cultivation in 1935 and that in 1934, and to the poor harvest last year. The official figures are:

Year	Area under Cultivation	Poor Harvest
1934	18,109,000 hectares	641,000 hectares 35 per cent
1935	12,953,000 hectares	806,000 hectares 63 per cent

In other words, there were less farms under cultivation in 1935 than in 1934 and the percentage of poor harvest nearly doubled that of 1934. The decline in the total of rice export in 1935 is 17 per cent. When it is remembered that rice makes up 85 per cent of Siam's total export, is there any wonder that Siamese farmers sent delegations from different places to their capital petitioning the government to better their conditions? The Siamese Minister of Economic Affairs said in the course of a parliamentary debate in self-defence that these delegations were engineered by certain interested parties, but with these figures before us, one is free to draw his own conclusions.

But how effective is the Chinese boycott? Let us analyse Siam's exported rice from January to September this year as to its distribution to different countries. The official figures are:

*Siam's Export of Rice to Different Countries.
January-September, 1935*

Place	Tons
SINGAPORE	367,187
HONGKONG	264,486
CHINA	96,938
JAPAN AND FORMOSA	19,938
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES	24,500

WEST INDIES AND SOUTH AMERICA	144,775	per cent of her exported rice went to the same places, and
GERMANY	8,807	there has been little change since then. The boycott of
ENGLAND	6,587	Siamese rice reduced, then, China's share in her total
EUROPE, EXCLUDING THE ABOVE TWO COUNTRIES ..	21,686	export of rice by some 15 per cent. When it is remembered
SOUTH AFRICA	13,179	that the boycott did not start until June, which means the
CEYLON	127,677	boycott was in force for only less than four months of the
INDIA	29,865	nine-month period considered, the success is all the more
OTHER COUNTRIES	5,408	astonishing.
TOTAL	1,131,480	

This means that during the first nine months last year rice exported by Siam to Singapore, Hongkong and China constituted only approximately 60 per cent of her total rice export. But in 1930 it was officially stated that 75

per cent of her exported rice went to the same places, and there has been little change since then. The boycott of Siamese rice reduced, then, China's share in her total export of rice by some 15 per cent. When it is remembered that the boycott did not start until June, which means the boycott was in force for only less than four months of the nine-month period considered, the success is all the more astonishing.

Little wonder then that the Siamese government sent a special envoy to China (stationed in Hongkong) to improve Sino-Siamese trade relations. Time would seem ripe for China to make another overture to the Siamese government to start negotiations for the establishment of treaty relationship between the two countries.

Main Issues Between Siam and China

By LIN YU (林幽)

THE history of China's attempts to establish treaty relations with Siam dates back to the reign of Emperor Kwang Hsu of the Ching dynasty, and during the republic several overtures were made with the same object in view. These attempts ended in failure, because the Siamese government has adopted a policy of procrastination. However, at one time it signified its willingness to start negotiations, provided that the questions to be discussed are known beforehand. The time seems ripe, as pointed out in the previous article, for China to make another overture to the Siamese government. It is therefore important that we know what are the issues involved. The two foregoing articles on the causes of, and the specific measures adopted by, the anti-Chinese movement in Siam give us some insight to the question, but in view of their importance it is necessary to treat these issues separately. Briefly there are four specific issues and one fundamental one. The specific issues are the nationality of Siam-born Chinese, the education of Chinese children in Siam, the protection of the economic investment of oversea Chinese in Siam, and the question of immigration, while the fundamental problem is a change in the attitude of both the Chinese and Siamese towards each other. All these problems have to be solved, if China and Siam are to settle down peacefully as neighbors.

First, let us take up the problem of nationality, on which the settlement of the question of the education of Chinese children and that of the treatment of oversea Chinese in general hinges. As the situation obtains at present, Siam claims Chinese children born in Siam as Siamese, on the principle of *jus soli*, while China claims them on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, and both countries claim the right to educate them after their own systems of education. If this problem is solved, then there is a principle on which we may base the solution of the education problem. Similarly the treatment of our compatriots in Siam also depends, in a large measure, upon the same question. Being the nationals of a non-treaty country with Siam, the Chinese are regarded as Siamese nationals upon landing. Time was this was not without its special privileges, such as the ownership of land, etc., but recently such privileges

are, we are reliably informed, fast disappearing. On the other hand, they are subject to poll tax, conscription, etc., too. The settlement of this question is therefore of paramount importance.

We may settle this issue with Siam by bringing it before the League of Nations, apart from negotiations for the establishment of treaty relations. There is a prevalent misconception that the question of enforcing nationality law is a matter of a state's internal administration and beyond the reach of the League. This is decidedly not the case. In 1922 France and her protectorate, Tunis, tried to enforce the nationality law based on the *jus soli* principle, making the children born of British parentage in Tunis either Tunisians or French. Britain protested and tried to bring up the question for arbitration, but in vain. The British then in 1923 brought the dispute before the League Council, and owing to French opposition, the Council requested the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague to give its expert opinion whether the enforcement of nationality law was a matter of a state's internal administration and therefore a problem beyond the competency of the League to handle. The Court returned the verdict that it was not. The Council therefore accepted the case. That the question was settled outside the League need not concern us here. What is important to us is that the League has set a precedence in handling such a dispute, and we may bring the case before the League, should Siam prove unduly obdurate toward a settlement of the question.

The actual settlement of the Tunis case should also prove suggestive of the solution. The first generation of the British progeny remains British, while the second generation becomes either French or Tunisians. We may reach a similar settlement with Siam so that the children born of Chinese parentage in Siam will remain Chinese, while their grandchildren will become Siamese. An alternative solution would be to leave the choice of nationality to the children when they come of age. The first solution is preferable because it settles the question definitely in a clear cut way and there can be no dispute